Advisory Details

June 2nd, 2014

(0Day) Rocket Servergraph Admin Center for TSM userRequest/tsmRequest Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

ZDI-14-164
ZDI-CAN-2259

CVE ID CVE-2014-3915
CVSS SCORE 10.0, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
AFFECTED VENDORS Rocket Software
AFFECTED PRODUCTS Rocket Servergraph
TREND MICRO CUSTOMER PROTECTION Trend Micro TippingPoint IPS customers are protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID ['13848', '13850', '13851']. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS: http://www.tippingpoint.com
VULNERABILITY DETAILS


This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Rocket Servergraph Admin Center for Tivoli Storage Manager. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the userRequest servlet. It is possible to inject arbitrary operating system commands when the servlet is processing auth, auth_session, auth_simple, add, add_flat, remove, set_pwd, add_permissions, revoke_permissions, runAsync, and tsmRequest commands. A remote attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute remote code under the context of the SYSTEM user.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS


This vulnerability is being disclosed publicly without a patch in accordance with the ZDI vulnerability disclosure policy on lack of vendor response.

Vendor Contact Timeline:
04/16/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
04/16/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/12/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
05/12/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/05/2014 - ZDI telephoned vendor's support line and were told we would receive a callback (no callback)
05/19/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact
05/19/2014 - Automated reply from vendor
05/21/2014 - ZDI emailed the vendor's support requesting contact and indicated final attempt/intent to move toward 0-day
06/02/2014 - Public release of advisory

-- Mitigation:
Given the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the service should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles.


DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
  • 2014-04-16 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
  • 2014-06-02 - Coordinated public release of advisory
CREDIT Andrea Micalizzi (rgod)
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